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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The ﬁtness of a strategy
is not constant, but depends on the relative abundances (=frequencies) of strategies in the
population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious
disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary
game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two
individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary
games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a
large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and
B, described by the payo  matrix
 ab
cd
 
. We study mutation and selection. If the payo s
are linear in a,b,c and d, then for weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if
 a + b > c +  d. This means the e ect of population structure on strategy selection can be
described by a single parameter,  . We present the values of   for various examples including
the well-mixed population, games on graphs and games in phenotype space. We give a proof for
the existence of  , which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain
(very natural) properties. Our proof assumes weak selection, but allows any mutation rate.
We discuss the relationship between   and the critical beneﬁt to cost ratio for the evolution of
cooperation. The single parameter,  , allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure
to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose e cient equilibria in coordination games.
1 Introduction
Game theory was invented by John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) to study strategic
and economic decisions of humans (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, Binmore 1994, Weibull 1995, Samuel-
son 1997). Evolutionary game theory was introduced by John Maynard Smith in order to explore
the evolution of animal behavior (Maynard Smith & Price 1973, Maynard Smith 1982, Houston &
McNamara 1999, McNamara et al 1999, Bshary et al 2008). In the meanwhile, evolutionary game
theory has been used in many areas of biology including ecology (May & Leonard 1975, Doebeli &
Knowlton 1998), host-parasite interactions (Turner & Chao 1999, Nowak & May 1994), bacterial
1population dynamics (Kerr et al 2002), immunological dynamics (Nowak et al 1995), the evolution
of human language (Nowak et al 2002) and the evolution of social behavior of humans (Trivers
1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Boyd & Richerson 2005, Nowak & Sigmund 2005). Evolutionary
game theory is the necessary tool of analysis whenever the success of one strategy depends on
the frequency of strategies in the population. Therefore, evolutionary game theory is a general
approach to evolutionary dynamics with constant selection being a special case (Nowak & Sigmund
2004).
In evolutionary game theory there is always a population of players. The interactions of the
game lead to payo , which is interpreted as reproductive success. Individuals, who receive a
higher payo , leave more o spring. Thereby, successful strategies outcompete less successful ones.
Reproduction can be genetic or cultural.
The traditional approach to evolutionary game theory is based on the replicator equation (Taylor
& Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et al 1979, Zeeman 1980, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988,1998, 2003, Cressman
2003), which examines deterministic dynamics in inﬁnitely large, well-mixed populations. Many
of our intuitions about evolutionary dynamics come from this approach (Hofbauer & Sigmund
1988). For example, a stable equilibrium of the replicator equation is a Nash equilibrium of the
underlying game. Another approach to evolutionary game theory is given by adaptive dynamics
(Nowak & Sigmund 1990, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1990, Metz et al 1996, Dieckman et al 2000) which
also assumes inﬁnitely large population size.
But if we want to understand evolutionary game dynamics in ﬁnite-sized populations, we need a
stochastic approach (Riley 1979, Scha er 1988, Fogel et al 1998, Ficici & Pollack 2000, Alos-Ferrer
2003). A crucial quantity is the ﬁxation probability of strategies; this is the probability that a
newly introduced mutant, using a di erent strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004,
Taylor et al 2004, Imhof & Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen, Pacheco & Imhof 2006, Lessard &
Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium condition
no longer implies evolutionary stability.
There has also been much interest in studying evolutionary games in spatial settings (Nowak
& May 1992, 1993, Ellison 1993, Herz 1994, Lindgren & Nordahl 1994, Ferriere & Michod 1996,
Killingback & Doebeli 1996, Nakamaru et al 1997, 1998, Nakamaru & Iwasa 2005, 2006, van Baalen
& Rand 1998, Yamamura et al 2004, Helbing & Wu 2008). Here most interactions occur among
nearest neighbors. The typical geometry for spatial games are regular lattices (Nowak et al 1994,
Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Szab´ o & T˝ oke 1998, Szab´ o et al. 2000), but evolutionary game dynamics
has also been studied in continuous space (Hutson & Vickers 1992, 2002, Hofbauer 1999).
Evolutionary graph theory is an extension of spatial games to more general population structures
and social networks (Lieberman et al 2005, Ohtsuki et al 2006, Pacheco et al 2006, Szab´ o & Fath
2007, Taylor et al 2007a, Santos at al 2008, Fu et al 2008). The members of the population
occupy the vertices of a graph. The edges determine who interacts with whom. Di erent update
rules can lead to very di erent outcomes of the evolutionary process, which emphasizes the general
idea that population structure greatly a ects evolutionary dynamics. For example, death-birth
updating on graphs allows the evolution of cooperation, if the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio exceeds the
average degree of the graph b/c > k (Ohtsuki et al 2006). Birth-death updating on graphs does
not favor evolution of cooperation. A replicator equation with a transformed payo  matrix can
describe deterministic evolutionary dynamics on regular graphs (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2007). There is
also a modiﬁed condition for what it means to be a Nash equilibrium for games on graphs (Ohtsuki
& Nowak 2008).
2Spatial models have also a long history of investigation in the study of ecosystems and ecological
interactions (Levin & Paine 1974, Durrett 1988, Hassel et al 1991, Durrett & Levin 1994). There
is also a literature on the dispersal behavior of animals (Hamilton & May 1977, Comins et al
1980, Gandon & Rousset 1999). Boerlijst & Hogeweg (1991) studied spatial models in prebiotic
evolution. The concept of a viscous population (Hamilton 1964) has given rise to the study of
population structure in the context of inclusive ﬁtness theory (Seger 1981, Grafen 1985, 2006,
Queller 1985, Taylor 1992b, Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998, Rousset & Billiard 2000, Rousset
2004, Taylor et al 2000, 2007b).
In this paper, we study the interaction between two strategies, A and B, given by the payo 
matrix
 
AB
A a b
B c d
 
(1)
We consider a mutation-selection process in a population of ﬁxed size N. Whenever an individual
reproduces, the o spring adopts the parent’s strategy with probability 1 u and adopts a random
strategy with probability u. We say that strategy A is selected over strategy B, if it is more
abundant in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process. We call this concept
‘strategy selection’.
In the limit of low mutation (u   0), the stationary distribution is non-zero only for populations
that are either all-A or all-B. The system spends only an inﬁnitesimal small fraction of time in
the mixed states. In this case, the question of strategy selection reduces to the comparison of the
ﬁxation probabilities,  A and  B. Here,  A is the probability that a single A mutant introduced in
a population of N   1 many B players generates a lineage of o spring that takes over the entire
population. In contrast, the probability that the A lineage becomes extinct is 1    A. Vice versa,
 B denotes the probability that a single B mutant introduced in a population of N   1 many A
players generates a lineage that takes over the entire population. The ﬁxation probabilities measure
global selection over the entire range of relative abundances (Nowak et al 2004). The condition for
A to be favored over B in the limit of low mutation is
 A >  B. (2)
For positive mutation rate (0 <u<1), the stationary distribution includes both homogeneous
and mixed states. In this case, strategy selection is determined by the inequality
 x  > 1/2. (3)
Here x is the frequency of A individuals in the population. The angular brackets denote the average
taken over all states of the system, weighted by the probability of ﬁnding the system in each state.
In the limit of low mutation, (3) is equivalent to (2).
Nowak et al (2004) have shown that in a well mixed population, in the limit of weak selection,
condition (2) is equivalent to
N   2
N
a + b>c+
N   2
N
d. (4)
Antal et al (2008a) have shown that condition (4) holds for a large variety of stochastic processes
that describe evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed populations, for any mutation rate and for any
3intensity of selection. But in this paper we focus on structured populations and the limit of weak
selection. A particular example of strategy selection in structured populations for any mutation
rate is studied by Antal et al (2008b).
In this paper we analyze (3) to show that for a wide variety of population structures the
condition for strategy A to be favored over strategy B can be written in the form
 a + b>c+  d. (5)
This condition holds for the limit of weak selection. The parameter   depends on the population
structure, the update rule and the mutation rate, but it does not depend on the payo  values
a,b,c,d. Thus, in the limit of weak selection, strategy selection in structured populations is de-
termined by a linear inequality. The e ect of population structure can be summarized by a single
parameter,  . Therefore, we call inequality (5) the ‘single-parameter condition’.
Note that   = 1 corresponds to the standard condition for risk-dominance (Harsanyi & Selten
1988, Gintis, 2000, Binmore, 2007). If   > 1 then the diagonal entries of the payo  matrix, a
and d, are more important than the o -diagonal entries, b and c. In this case, the population
structure can favor the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which is deﬁned
by c > a > d > b. If   > 1 then the population structure can favor the Pareto-e cient strategy
over the risk-dominant strategy in a coordination game. A coordination game is deﬁned by a > c
and b < d. Strategy A is Pareto e cient if a>d . Strategy B is risk-dominant if a + b < c + d. If
  < 1 then the population structure can favor the evolution of spite.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the necessary
assumptions that allow us to prove (5). In Section 3 we show the relationship between   and the
critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. An interesting consequence is that
for the purpose of calculating   it su ces to study games that have simpliﬁed payo  matrices.
In Section 4 we present a number of examples of games in structured populations that lead to a
single-parameter condition. These examples include games in the well-mixed population, games
on regular and heterogeneous graphs, games on replacement and interaction graphs, and games in
phenotype space. In Section 5 we give a proof of the single-parameter condition, which holds for
weak selection and any mutation rate. Section 6 is a summary of our ﬁndings.
2 Model and results
We consider stochastic evolutionary dynamics (with mutation and selection) in a structured pop-
ulation of ﬁnite size, N. Individuals adopt either strategy A or B. Individuals obtain a pay-
o  by interacting with other individuals according to the underlying population structure. For
example, the population structure could imply that interactions occur only between neighbors
on a graph (Ohtsuki et al 2006), inhabitants of the same island or individuals that share cer-
tain phenotypic properties (Antal et al 2008b). Based on these interactions, an average (or to-
tal) payo  is calculated according to the payo  matrix (1). We assume that the payo  is lin-
ear in a,b,c,d, with no constant terms. For instance, the total payo  of an A individual is
[a   (number of A-interactants) + b   (number of B-interactants)]. The e ective payo  of an indi-
vidual is given by 1 +   · Payo . The parameter   denotes the intensity of selection. The limit of
weak selection is given by     0.
Reproduction is subject to mutation. With probability u the o spring adopts a random strategy
(which is either A or B). With probability 1   u the o spring adopts the parent’s strategy. For
4u = 0 there is no mutation, only selection. For u = 1 there is no selection, only mutation. If
0 <u<1 then there is mutation and selection.
Our proof of the single parameter condition (5) holds for update rules that have the following
two (very natural) properties.
(i) The update is payo -proportional with either constant birth rate or constant death rate.
Each update event consists of two steps: birth and death. One individual is chosen to give
birth, and one individual is chosen to die. The order of the two steps is arbitrary: birth can
be followed by death or vice versa. But only one of the two steps is proportional to payo ,
while the other step is entirely independent of payo  and happens with the same probability
to all individuals in the population. We discuss a few examples below.
(ii) The update rule is symmetric for the two strategies.
The update rule di erentiates between A and B only based on payo . Relabeling the two
strategies and correspondingly swapping the entries of the payo  matrix must yield symmetric
dynamics. This assumption is entirely natural. It means that the di erence between A and
B is fully captured by the payo  matrix, while the population structure and update rule do
not introduce any additional di erence between A and B.
Let us now discuss a few update rules that fulﬁll assumption (i). A typical example is death-
birth (DB) updating on graphs (Ohtsuki et al 2006): a random individual is chosen to die; the
neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their payo . This means that death is entirely
independent of payo , while birth is proportional to payo . Another example is the synchronous
updating used by Antal et al (2008b) for ‘games in phenotype space’. There are discrete generations,
as in a Wright-Fisher process (Ewens, 2004). Individuals reproduce proportional to payo . All
individuals die from one generation to the next and hence death is again entirely independent of
payo .
An update rule that does not fulﬁll assumption (i) is birth-death (BD) updating on graphs
(Ohtsuki et al 2006): an individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to payo ; the o spring
replaces a randomly chosen neighbor. Here the death event is not independent of payo , because
there is a correlation between strategies (and thus payo s) of neighboring individuals on the graph.
It turns out that for this update rule condition (5) still holds, but we need another proof that will
be presented in a forthcoming paper.
Therefore we already know that (5) holds for a larger class of models than what is covered in this
paper. Our assumption (i) of a constant birth rate or a constant death rate is needed for the type of
proof that is given here, but we expect (5) to hold for most models that satisfy payo -proportional
update together with the symmetry assumption (ii).
In this paper, we ﬁrst show that if assumptions (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed, then the condition for
strategy A to be favored over strategy B can be written in the form
ka+ k b>k  c + kd. (6)
The factors k and k  depend on the population structure and the update rule, but not on the entries
of the payo  matrix. Condition (6) only depends on the single parameter   = k/k , but one has
to be careful about the sign of k , since dividing by k  can change the direction of the inequality.
5Thus, in general, one can write the condition for strategy A to be favored over strategy B as a
single-parameter condition. If k    0, this condition becomes
 a + b>c+  d (7)
If the parameter   tends to inﬁnity then condition (7) becomes a > d. If   is zero then condition
(7) becomes b > c.
The condition k    0 is a very natural one and can be expected to hold in most cases. It holds
for structures and update rules for which the game given by the payo  matrix
 
AB
A 01
B 00
 
(8)
does not disfavor strategy A.
3 Evolution of cooperation
There is a relationship between the critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation
(Nowak 2006b) and the parameter  . In a simpliﬁed version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game a
cooperator, C, pays a cost, , for another individual to receive a beneﬁt, . We have > > 0.
Defectors, D, distribute no beneﬁts and pay no costs. We obtain the payo  matrix
 
CD
C    
D 0
 
(9)
Using condition (7) for payo  matrix (9) we obtain
 (   )   > (10)
For   > 1 this condition means that cooperators are more abundant than defectors whenever the
beneﬁt-to-cost ratio / is larger than the critical value
    
=
  +1
    1
(11)
Alternatively,   can be expressed by the critical ( / )  ratio as
  =
( / )  +1
( / )    1
(12)
Here we have   > 1. Note that even without the assumption > > 0, the same   is obtained
from (10), only some care is required to ﬁnd the correct signs.
Thus, for any population structure and update rule that satisfy our assumptions, if the critical
beneﬁt-to-cost ratio is known, we can immediately obtain   and vice versa. For example, for DB
6updating on regular graphs of degree k we know that ( / )  = k (Ohtsuki et al 2006). Using
equation (12), this implies   =( k + 1)/(k   1) which is in agreement with equation (17).
This demonstrates the practical advantage of relationship (12). In order to derive   for the
general game (1), it su ces to study the speciﬁc game (9) and to derive the critical beneﬁt-cost
ratio, ( / ) . Then (12) gives us the answer. It is sometimes easier to study the speciﬁc game
(9) than to study the general game (1). Speciﬁcally, using (9) often spares the calculation of
probabilities that three randomly chosen players share the same strategy (for example, coe cient
  in Antal et al, 2008b).
Wild and Traulsen (2007) argue that the general payo  matrix (1) allows the study of synergistic
e ects between players in the weak selection limit, as opposed to the simpliﬁed matrix (9) where
such e ects are not present. Here we demonstrated that these synergistic e ects do not matter
if we are only interested in the question whether A is more abundant than B in the stationary
distribution of the mutation-selection process. Of course, our observation does not suggest that the
analysis of general games, given by (1), can be completely replaced by the analysis of simpler games,
given by (9). Questions concerning which strategies are Nash equilibria, which are evolutionarily
stable or when we have coexistence or bi-stability can only be answered by studying the general
matrix. For such analyses see Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006, 2008) or Taylor & Nowak (2007).
Note also that instead of the simpliﬁed Prisoner’s Dilemma payo  matrix, we can also consider
other types of simpliﬁed payo  matrices in order to calculate  . Two examples are
 
1 b
00
 
or
 
10
c 0
 
(13)
4 The single-parameter conjecture
Let us consider a game between two strategies A and B that is given by the payo  matrix (1). We
study a variety of di erent population structures and always observe that for weak selection the
condition for A to be favored over B can be written in the form  a+b > c+ d. For each example
we give the value of  . The derivations of these results have been given in papers which we cite.
For the star we present a new calculation.These observations have led to the conjecture that for
weak selection the e ect of population structure on strategy selection can ‘always’ be summarized
by a single parameter,  .
4.1 The well-mixed population
As ﬁrst example we consider the frequency dependent Moran process in a well mixed population
of size N (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Nowak 2006a) (Fig. 1a). In the language of
evolutionary graph theory, a well-mixed population corresponds to a complete graph with identical
weights. Each individual interacts with all other N   1 individuals equally likely and obtains an
average (or total) payo . For DB updating we ﬁnd for weak selection and any mutation rate (Antal
et al 2008a)
  =
N   2
N
(14)
Hence, for any ﬁnite well-mixed population we have   < 1. In the limit N    , we obtain   = 1,
which yields the standard condition of risk-dominance, a + b > c + d. The   given by eq (14) can
also be found in the paper by Kandori et al (1993) who study a process that is stochastic in the
generation of mutants, but deterministic in following the gradient of selection.
74.2 Graph structured populations
In such models, the players occupy the vertices of a graph, which is assumed to be ﬁxed. The
edges denote links between individuals in terms of game dynamical interaction and biological re-
production. Individuals play a game only with their neighbors and an average (or total) payo  is
calculated. In this section we consider death-birth (DB) updating: at any one time step, a random
individual is chosen to die, and the neighbors compete for the empty spot, proportional to their
ﬁtness (Ohtsuki et al 2006).
4.2.1 Cycle
Let us imagine N individuals that are aligned in a one dimensional array. Each individual is
connected to its two neighbors, and the ends are joined up (Fig. 1b). The cycle is a regular graph
of degree k = 2. Games on cycles have been studied by many authors including Ellison (1993),
Nakamaru et al (1997), Ohtsuki et al (2006) and Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006a). The following result
can be found in Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006) and holds for weak selection. For DB updating and low
mutation (u   0) we have
  =
3N   8
N
. (15)
Note that   is an increasing function of the population size, N, and converges to   = 3 for large
N.
We have also performed simulations for a cycle with non-vanishing mutation (Fig. 2a). We ﬁnd
that   decreases with increasing mutation rate, u.
4.2.2 Star
The star is another graph structure, which can be calculated exactly. There are N individuals.
One individual occupies the center of the star and the remaining N   1 individuals populate the
periphery (Fig. 1c). The center is connected to all other individuals and, therefore, has degree
k = N   1. Each individual in the periphery is only connected to the center and, therefore, has
degree k = 1. The average degree of the star is given by ¯ k = 2(N   1)/N. For large population
size, N, the star and the cycle have the same average degree. Yet the population dynamics are
very di erent. For DB updating on a star we ﬁnd
  = 1 (16)
This result holds for weak selection and for any population size N   3 and any mutation rate u.
The calculation for the star is shown in Appendix A. Simulations for the star conﬁrm that   =1
for any mutation rate (Fig. 2b).
4.2.3 Regular graphs of degree k
Let us now consider the case where the individuals of a population of size N occupy the vertices of
a regular graph of degree k   2. Each individual is connected to exactly k other individuals (Fig.
1d). For this structure, Ohtsuki et al (2006) obtain (see equation 24 in their online material)
  =
k +1
k   1
. (17)
8This result holds for DB updating, weak selection, low mutation and large population size, N   k.
The parameter   depends on the degree of the graph and is always larger than one. For large values
of k,   converges to one. The limit of large k agrees with the result for the complete graph, which
corresponds to a well-mixed population.
For general population size N, the calculation of Ohtsuki et al (2006) is not applicable, but we
can obtain the parameter   di erently. Taylor et al (2007a) and Lehmann et al (2007) studied the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (9) for the same structure but for general N. They obtained the critical
beneﬁt-to-cost ratio as ( / )  =( N   2)/(N/k   2). Using the relationship (12), we obtain
  =
(k + 1)N   4k
(k   1)N
. (18)
As a consistency check, taking N   in (18) leads to (17). Moreover, setting k = 2 in (18) leads
to (15), and setting k = N   1 in (18) agrees with (14), as expected.
Computer simulations for a regular graph with k = 3 and N = 6, for mutation rate u =0 .1
suggest that   =0 .937. The corresponding prediction of (18) for low mutation is   = 1. Thus we
conclude that   depends on the mutation rate u (Fig. 2c).
Our proof of the linear inequality is not restricted to homogeneous graphs. Random graphs
(Bollob´ as 1995) also satisfy our assumptions, and therefore we expect the single parameter condition
to hold. We have performed simulations for a random graph with N = 10 and average degree k = 2.
We ﬁnd a linear condition with   =1 .636 (see Fig. 2d).
4.2.4 Di erent interaction and replacement graphs
Individuals could have di erent neighborhoods for the game dynamical interaction and for the
evolutionary updating. In this case, we place the individuals of the population on the edges of
two di erent graphs (Ohtsuki et al 2007). The interaction graph determines who meets whom for
playing the game. The replacement graph determines who learns from whom (or who competes
with whom) for updating of strategies. The vertices of the two graphs are identical; the edges can
be di erent (Fig. 1e).
Suppose both graphs are regular. The interaction graph has degree h. The replacement graph
has degree g. The two graphs deﬁne an overlap graph, which contains all those edges that the
interaction and replacement graph have in common. Let us assume that this overlap graph is
regular and has degree l. We always have l   min{h,g}. The following result holds for DB
updating for weak selection and large population size (Ohtsuki et al 2007):
  =
gh+ l
gh  l
. (19)
For general population size, N, we can obtain   via the critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (9). Using the result of Taylor et al. (2007), we obtain ( / )  =
(N   2)/(Nl/gh   2). Hence, we have
  =
(gh+ l)N   4gh
(gh  l)N
. (20)
As a consistency check, g = h = l = k reproduces (18).
94.3 Games in phenotype space
Antal et al (2008b) proposed a model for the evolution of cooperation based on phenotypic similarity.
There is a one dimensional phenotype space given by a discrete lattice (Fig. 1f). Individuals
interact with those who share the same phenotype. The population size is constant and given by
N. Evolutionary dynamics can be calculated for DB updating or synchronous updating. There is
a strategy mutation rate, u, and a phenotypic mutation rate,  . When an individual reproduces,
its o spring has the same phenotype with probability 1   2  and mutates to either one of the two
neighboring phenotypes with equal probability  .
The game can be generalized to the interaction between any two strategies A and B. The
resulting expression for   is complicated and depends on all parameters, including the two mutation
rates, u and  . For Nu  0, N    0 and weak selection we obtain
  = 1 +
 
3 (21)
Note that this example has seemingly an inﬁnite state space, which is not something we address
in our proof, but a subtle trick turns the state space into a ﬁnite one. A detailed description can
be found in Antal et al (2008b).
5 Proof of the single-parameter conjecture
In the ﬁrst part of the proof we will show that for update rules that satisfy our assumption (i) in
Section 2, the condition for strategy A to be favored over strategy B is linear in a,b,c,d with no
constant terms. More precisely, it can be written as
k1a + k2b > k3c + k4d. (22)
Here k1,k 2,k 3,k 4 are real numbers, which can depend on the population structure, the update rule,
the mutation rate and the population size, but not on the payo  values a,b,c,d.
In the second part of the proof we will show that for update rules that also satisfy our symmetry
assumption (ii) in Section 2, this linearity leads to the existence of  . Thus the condition that A
is favored over B becomes
 a + b>c+  d (23)
5.1 Linearity
A state, S, of the population is a list of strategies of the N individuals as well as, if any, their
physical position, phenotypic state, or other information that can a ect the ﬁtness of players. For
our proof, we assume a ﬁnite state space. We study a Markov process on this state space and we
are concerned with the stationary probabilities of this process. A more detailed discussion of these
stationary probabilities can be found in Appendix C.
In a state S, let xS denote the frequency of A individuals in the population. Then the frequency
of B individuals is 1 xS. We are interested in the average frequency of A individuals, the average
being taken over all possible states weighted by the stationary probability that the system is in
those states. Let us denote this average frequency by  x . The condition for strategy A to be
favored over strategy B is that the average frequency of A is greater than 1/2 (i.e. on average, A
individuals are more than 50%). This condition is hard to deal with analytically. However, for a
10large class of update rules, in the limit of weak selection, this condition becomes equivalent to the
simpler one
  xsel  > 0 (24)
Here   xsel  is the average e ect of selection on the expected change in x. As before, the average
is taken over all states S, weighted by the probability that the system is in each one of the states.
In Appendix B we show that this equivalence is true for processes for which either the death rate
or the birth rate is constant (eg. Death-Birth, Synchronous or a variant of Birth-Death updating).
Once we have this equivalence, we can proceed to calculate the average change in the frequency
of A due to selection in one update step, which can be written as
  xsel  =
 
S
 xS ·  S (25)
where  xS is the expected change due to selection in the frequency of A individuals in a given
state S of the system and  S is the probability to ﬁnd the system in that state.
Let si be the strategy of individual i, where si = 1 denotes A and si = 0 denotes B. Then, in
a given state S of the system, the expected change of x due to selection in one update step is the
number of o spring of A individuals minus the number of A individuals in the previous generation,
divided by the population size. Thus, it is given by
 xS =
1
N
 
 
i
si i  
 
i
si
 
(26)
where  i is the expected number of o spring of individual i (including himself if he survives).
For our update rules, for which who gives birth or who dies is chosen proportional to the e ective
payo  (assumption (i)),  i is continuous and inﬁnitely di erentiable at   = 0. Hence  xS is as well
and we can write its Taylor expansion at   =0
 xS =  x
(0)
S +   x
(1)
S + O( 2) (27)
Here  x
(0)
S is the change in state S, when   = 0.  x
(1)
S is the ﬁrst derivative of  xS with respect
to  , evaluated at   = 0.
The probability  S that the system is in state S also depends on  . For update rules satisfying
assumption (i), we show in Appendix C that  S is also continuous and di erentiable as a function
of  . Thus, we can write its Taylor expansion at   =0
 S =  
(0)
S +   
(1)
S + O( 2) (28)
As before, the (0) superscript refers to the neutral state   = 0 and  
(1)
S =d  S/d  evaluated at
  = 0.
Since  xS and  S are both continuous and di erentiable at   = 0 it follows from (25) that
  xsel  is as well. Using their Taylor expansions (27) and (28) into (25) we can then write
  xsel  =
 
S
 xS ·  S
=
 
S
 x
(0)
S ·  
(0)
S +  
 
S
 
 x
(1)
S ·  
(0)
S +  x
(0)
S ·  
(1)
S
 
+ O( 2)
=  
 
S
 
 x
(1)
S ·  
(0)
S +  x
(0)
S ·  
(1)
S
 
+ O( 2)
(29)
11For the last equality we used the fact that, for the neutral process, the average change in A over
all states is zero, that is
 
S  x
(0)
S ·  
(0)
S = 0.
Thus, in the limit of weak selection, the condition (24) that A is favored over B becomes
 
S
 
 x
(1)
S ·  
(0)
S +  x
(0)
S ·  
(1)
S
 
> 0 (30)
Note that  x
(0)
S and  
(0)
S contain no terms in a,b,c,d because they correspond to neutral
selection,   = 0. We will show in Appendix C that both  x
(1)
S and  
(1)
S are linear in a,b,c,d with
no constant terms. Hence, from (30) we deduce that our condition for strategy A to be favored
over strategy B is linear in a,b,c,d and is of the form (22).
5.2 Existence of Sigma
We have thus shown that for structures satisfying assumption (i), the condition for strategy A to
be favored over strategy B has the form (22)
k1a + k2b>k 3c + k4d
For structures which moreover satisfy our symmetry condition (assumption (ii)), we obtain the
symmetric relation by simply relabeling. Thus, strategy B is favored over strategy A if and only if
k1d + k2c > k3b + k4a (31)
Since both strategies can not be favored at the same time, strategy A must be favored if and
only if
k4a + k3b>k 2c + k1d (32)
Since both conditions (22) and (32) are if and only if conditions that A is favored over B, they
must be equivalent. Thus, it must be that (32) is a scalar multiple of (22), so there must exist
some   > 0 such that k4 =  k1 =  2k4 and k3 =  k2 =  2k3. Thus, we conclude that   = 1 and
that k1 = k4 = k and k2 = k3 = k . So the condition that A is favored over B becomes
ka+ k b>k  c + kd (33)
Note that this condition depends only on the parameter   = k/k . However, one must exercise
caution in dividing by k  because its sign can change the direction of the inequality. If k    0, then
we can rewrite (33) as
 a + b>c+  d (34)
Note that in this case   could be inﬁnite and then the condition that A is favored over B reduces
to a > d.
Note also that k    0 is a very natural condition which we expect to be satisﬁed in most cases.
It is equivalent to saying that in the game given by the matrix
 
AB
A 01
B 00
 
(35)
strategy A is not disfavored.
126 Conclusion
We have studied evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations. We have investigated the
interaction between two strategies, A and B, given by the payo  matrix
 
AB
A a b
B c d
 
(36)
We have shown that the condition for A to be more abundant than B in the stationary distribution
of the mutation selection process can be written as a simple linear inequality
 a + b>c+  d (37)
This condition holds for all population structures, for weak selection, but any mutation rate. The
parameter   captures the e ect of population structure. It quantiﬁes the degree to which individuals
using the same strategy are more likely (  > 1) or less likely (  < 1) to interact than individuals
using di erent strategies. The value of   can depend on the population structure, the update rule,
the population size, the mutation rate, but it does not depend on the entries of the payo  matrix.
For each particular problem the speciﬁc value of   must be calculated. Here we have shown that
there always is a simple linear inequality with a single parameter,  , given that some very natural
assumptions hold.
Speciﬁcally, our proof is based on two assumptions: (i) the update rule consists of two steps,
birth and death; one of those steps is proportional to payo , but the other step is independent of
payo ; this means all individuals either die with the same probability or give birth with the same
probability; (ii) the population structure does not introduce additional asymmetries between A and
B; all the di erences between A and B are entirely described by the payo  matrix.
Based on previous examples we know that  a + b>c+   also holds for update rules that are
proportional to payo , but violate assumption (i). Although our proof does not work in this case,
we can expect this result for weak selection. As explained in Appendix C, whenever   occurs in
an equation, it will occur together with a,b,c, or d and vice versa. For the limit of weak selection,
only linear terms in   remain. These terms will also be linear in a,b,c,d. Hence, the ﬁnal condition
must be linear. If assumption (ii) is satisﬁed, this condition is symmetric and will have only one
parameter. Examples for such update rules include birth-death (BD) updating on graphs (Ohtsuki
et al 2006) and various forms of group selection (Traulsen & Nowak 2006, Traulsen et al 2008).
Appendix A : Calculations for the star
Unlike the structures studied so far, the star is a structure for which  x
(0)
S  = 0. However, the star
satisﬁes our assumptions. It can be shown (as we do in general in Appendix C) that for the star,
 
(1)
S is linear in a,b,c,d. Thus, we know that a single parameter condition must be satisﬁed for the
star. However, it is hard to calculate directly what  
(1)
S is for all states S. We use the symmetry of
the star to deduce the   for any mutation and weak selection.
For the star with N nodes we have 2N states which we will denote by (0,i) and (1,i), where
i =0 ,...N  1 is the number of A players on the leaves. (0,i) means that there is a B in the hub;
(1,i) means that there is an A in the hub.
13Then, for DB updating we can write the following transition probabilities:
 
                     
                     
P((0,i)   (0,i  1)) =
i
N
P((0,i)   (0,i+ 1)) = u
N   i   1
N
P((0,i)   (1,i)) =
u
N
+ (1   u)
i
N(N   1)
 
1+ 
N   i   1
N   1
(b   d)
 
P((0,i)   (0,i)) = (1   u)
N   i   1
N
 
1+
1
N   1
 
1+ 
i
N   1
(d   b)
  
(38)
and  
                     
                     
P((1,i)   (1,i  1)) = u
i
N
P((1,i)   (1,i+ 1)) =
N   i   1
N
P((1,i)   (0,i)) =
u
N
+ (1   u)
N   i   1
N(N   1)
 
1+ 
i
N   1
(c   a)
 
P((1,i)   (1,i)) = (1   u)
i
N
 
1+
1
N   1
 
1+ 
N   i   1
N   1
(a   c)
  
(39)
So all these transition probabilities don’t depend on a,b,c,d independently, but in fact on b d
and a c. Thus,  S, the probabilities of ﬁnding the system in each state, also depend only on a c
and b   d, and not on a,b,c,d independently.
Moreover, if we look at the change due to selection in each state we have:
• in state (0,i)
 x = i
 
 
N   2
N(N   1)
+  
N   i   1
N(N   1)2(b   d)
 
(40)
• in state (1,i)
 x =
N   2
N
+ i
 
 
N   2
N(N   1)
+  
N   i   1
N(N   1)2(a   c)
 
(41)
Here, as well, we note that  x does not depend independently on a,b,c,d but only on a c and
b   d because basically it only matters who the leaves play with (an A or a B in the hub). Thus,
we conclude that our expression (30) which gives the sigma condition depends on a   c and b   d
linearly. Thus, it must be of the form:
(a   c)g(N,u)+( b   d)h(N,u) > 0 (42)
where g and h are functions of the parameters N and u.
However, this has to be precisely the sigma relation for the star (since it is derived from (30)),
and hence must be identical to  a + b>c+  d (and here we know that   > 0). This implies that
the coe cients of a and  d must be equal (and respectively those of b and  c). Hence we conclude
that g(N,u)=h(N,u) and hence   = 1, for any population size N and any mutation rate u.
14Appendix B: Update rules
As we explained, our approach works only for update rules for which the condition  x  > 1/2 is
equivalent to   xsel  > 0. Below we show that this equivalence holds for all update rules which
have constant birth rate or constant death rate (assumption (2)). This condition is su cient but
may not be necessary. In a forthcoming paper we show, however, that there are processes for
which neither the birth rate nor the death rate is constant and the two conditions above are not
equivalent.
In a given state S, let i,S be the average number of descendants of individual i. Let i,S be
the probability that individual i dies in state S. We denote by  i,S the average ﬁtness of individual
i at state S, which we can express as
 i,S = i,S + (1   i,S) (43)
Since the total population size, N, is constant, we must have that
 
i
 i,S = N   
 
i
i,S =
 
i
i,S (44)
In one step we can separate the total change of frequency  xtot into a part due to selection and
a part due to mutation:
 xtot
S =  xsel
S +  xmut
S (45)
In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we will omit state S when it is obvious. In Section 3
we calculated the change in the frequency of A due to selection, in state S, to be
 xsel
S =
1
N
  
i
si i  
 
i
si
 
=
1
N
 
i
si( i   i) (46)
We can also write the change in the frequency of A due to both selection and mutation
 xtot
S =
1
N
  
i
si
  
1  
u
2
 
i +1  i
 
+ (1   si)
u
2
i  
 
i
si
 
(47)
The ﬁrst term is the average change in A due to selection (birth - death) and the second term
is the average change due to mutation. We want to relate the average total change to the average
change due to selection and to the average frequency of A individuals. In general, it is hard.
However, if the death rate is constant ( i = ) or the birth rate is constant ( i = ) such a
relationship is immediate.
If the death rate is constant, i = , then using (44) and (46) we can rewrite (47) as
 xtot
S =
1
N
  
i
si( i   )+
u
2
 
i
(1   si)
 
= (1   u) xsel
S + u · (1   xS)
(48)
Here xS =
 
i si/N is the frequency of A individuals in state S.
15We know however that in the stationary state, the average total change is zero, i.e.   xtot  = 0.
So averaging (48) over all possible states, weighted by the probability to ﬁnd the system in those
states, we obtain
0=  xtot  = (1   u)  xsel  + u · (1    x ) (49)
Thus, we conclude that the average frequency of A can be expressed in terms of the average
change due to selection as
 x  =
1
2
+
1   u
u ·
  xsel  (50)
If the birth rate is constant, i = , then a similar argument leads to the relationship
 x  =
1
2
+
1   u
u ·
  xsel  (51)
In both case, the condition  x  > 1/2 is obviously equivalent to   xsel  > 0, as claimed.
Note that our proof does not work for the more familiar BD updating in which one individual
is chosen to reproduce proportional to the e ective payo  and its o spring replaces a random
neighbor. The reason is that in this case neither the birth rate, nor the death rate are constant
and there is no immediate relationship between them other than (44). Furthermore, we show in
a forthcoming paper that for this BD updating, the conditions  x  > 1/2 and   xsel  > 0 are
not equivalent. Thus, our theory does not apply. We do show however, that in the limit of low
mutation, u   0, our single parameter condition holds.
Appendix C: Continuity and Linearity for  S
In this Appendix we will show that the probability  S that the system is in state S is continuous
at   = 0, inﬁnitely di erentiable and moreover that  
(1)
S is linear in a,b,c,d. We show this for
processes satisfying our assumptions. This part of the proof works not only for constant death or
constant birth updates, but for any update rules that do not introduce any functions that do not
have Taylor expansions at   = 0.
Note that given the payo  function 1 +   · payo , we introduce   together with a,b,c and d.
So, unless we di erentiate with respect to   or evaluate at   = const, whenever we have a degree k
term in  , it must be accompanied by a degree k term in a,b,c or d and vice versa. Moreover,  
can not be accompanied by a constant term, i.e. a term that does not contain a,b,c or d.
Let  i denote the expected number of o spring of individual i due to selection. For processes
for which the update is proportional to the e ective payo , we can write the Taylor expansion of
 i at   = 0:
 i = ai0 + ai1  + O( 2) (52)
The notation O( 2) denotes terms of order  2 or higher. They are negligible for     0. As we
mentioned above, we only introduce   together with linear terms in a,b,c,d and we only introduce
a,b,c,d together with  . Thus, we must have that in the expression of  i, ai0 contains no a,b,c,d
terms whereas ai1 contains linear terms in a,b,c,d and no constant terms. Note that this is in
agreement with what we obtain for the DB and Synchronous updates in Appendix C.
16Since  i is a polynomial in  ,  xS is continuous in   and in particular at   = 0. Thus, we can
write the Taylor expansion of  xS at   =0
 xS =  x
(0)
S +   x
(1)
S + O( 2)
=  x
(0)
S +
 
N
 
i
si
d i
d 
 
   
   
 =0
+ O( 2)
=  x
(0)
S +
 
N
 
i
ai1si + O( 2)
(53)
Here  x
(0)
S is the change in state S when   = 0. From the above we conclude that  x
(1)
S = siai1/N
which is linear in a,b,c,d and has no degree zero term.
The probability  S that the system is in state S also depends on  . For our structures and
update rules we will now show that  S is continuous and di erentiable at   = 0. In order to ﬁnd
 S, we need the transition probabilities Pij to go from state Sj to state Si. Then the vector of
probabilities  (S) is an eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1 of the stochastic matrix P. The
matrix P is primitive, i.e. there exists some integer k such that Pk > 0. This is because we study
a selection-mutation process and hence our system has no absorbing subset of states.
Since the matrix P is stochastic and primitive, the Perron-Frobenius theorem ensures that 1 is
its largest eigenvalue, that it is a simple eigenvalue and that to it, there corresponds an eigenvector
with positive entries summing up to 1. This is precisely our vector of probabilities.
To ﬁnd this eigenvector we perform Gaussian elimination (aka row echelon reduction) on the
system Pv = v. Since 1 is a simple eigenvalue for P, the system we need to solve has only one
degree of freedom; thus we can express the eigenvector in terms of the one free variable, which
without loss of generality can be vn:
v1 =  vnh1, ... vi =  vnhi, ... vn 1 =  vnhn 1 (54)
The eigenvector that we are interested in is the vector with non-zero entries which sum up to 1.
For this vector we have
1=vn( h1   ...   hn 1 + 1) (55)
For our structures and update rules, the transition probabilities have Taylor expansions around
  = 0 and thus can be written as polynomials in  . As before, since any   is accompanied by a
linear term in a,b,c,d, the coe cients of these polynomials have the same degree in a,b,c,d as the
accompanying  . Because of the elementary nature of the row operations performed, the elements
of the reduced matrix will be fractions of polynomials (i.e. rational functions of  ). Thus, hi above
are all rational functions of  . Therefore, from (55) we conclude that vn must also be a rational
function of  . This implies that in our vector of probabilities, all the entries are rational functions .
Thus  S is a fraction of polynomials in   which we write in irreducible form. The only way that this
is not continuous at   = 0 is if the denominator is zero at   = 0. But in that case, lim  0  S =  
which is impossible since  S is a probability. Therefore,  S is continuous at   = 0.
Moreover, we can write
 S =
b0S + b1Sw + O( 2)
c0S + c1Sw + O( 2)
(56)
17We have obtained this form for  S by performing the following operations: Taylor expansions of
the transition probabilities and elementary row operations on these Taylor expansions. Hence, any
  that was introduced from the beginning was accompanied by linear terms in a,b,c,d and no
constants, and due to the elementary nature of the above operations, nothing changed. So b0S and
c0S contain no a,b,c,d terms whereas b1S and c1S contain only linear a,b,c,d and no degree zero
terms. Di erentiating  S once we obtain
 
(1)
S (w)=
b1Sc0S   b0Sc1S + O(w)
c2
0S + O(w)
(57)
We want to show the linearity of  
(1)
S which is  
(1)
S (0). Thus, we have
 
(1)
S =
b1Sc0S   b0Sc1S
c2
0S
(58)
Since b0S,c 0S contain no a,b,c,d and b1S,c 1S are linear in a,b,c,d and have no free constant terms,
we conclude that  
(1)
S is linear in a,b,c,d and has no free constant term.
We have thus shown that both ( x)
(1)
S and  
(1)
S are continuous and linear in a,b,c,d with no
free constant terms. Thus, the condition
 
S
 
 x
(1)
S ·  
(0)
S +  x
(0)
S ·  
(1)
S
 
> 0 (59)
derived in Section 5.1 for strategy A to be favored over strategy B is linear in a,b,c,d and has no
free constant terms. Thus, it can be written as
k1a + k2b>k 3c + k4d (60)
as claimed. This concludes our proof.
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standard deviation: N   2
Phenotype Space
Figure 1: Various population structures for which   values are known. (a) For the well-mixed
population we have   =( N 2)/N for any mutation rate. (b) For the cycle we have   = (3N 8)/N
for low mutation. (c) For the star we have   = 1 for any mutation rate and any population size,
N   3. (d) For regular graphs of degree k we have   =( k + 1)/(k   1) for low mutation
and large population size. (e) If there are di erent interaction and replacement graphs, we have
  =( gh + l)/(gh   l) for low mutation and large population size. The interaction graph, the
replacement graph and the overlap graph between these two are all regular and have degrees, g, h
and l, respectively. (f) For ‘games in phenotype space’ we ﬁnd   = 1 +
 
3 for a one dimensional
phenotype space, low mutation rates and large population size. All results hold for DB updating
and weak selection.
24Figure 2: Numerical simulations conﬁrm the linear inequality  a+b > c+ d. We study the payo 
matrix a = 1, b = S, c = T, and d = 0 for  1   S   1 and 0   T   2. The red line is the
equilibrium condition T = S +  . Below this line A is favored. (a) For a cycle with N = 5 and
mutation rate, u =0 .2, we ﬁnd   =1 .271. The theoretical result for low mutation is   =1 .4.
Thus,   depends on the mutation rate. (b) For a star with N = 5 we ﬁnd   = 1 for u =0 .1. (c)
For a regular graph with k = 3 and N = 6 we ﬁnd   =0 .937 for u =0 .1. The prediction of (18)
for low mutation is   = 1. Here again   depends on the mutation rate. (d) For this random graph
with N = 10 and average degree k = 2 we ﬁnd   =1 .636 for u =0 .05. For all simulations the
intensity of selection is   =0 .005. Each point is an average over 2   106 runs.
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